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INTRODUCTION 
Claims of copyright protection that overreach the bounds of 
justifiable legal rights occur in many different contexts.  Indeed, in 
almost any copyright litigation, issues regularly surround the 
legitimacy of the copyright and the rightful claim to it.  Although 
multitudes of copyright questions arise daily, few of them ever go 
before a judge.  Most people struggle with their conflicts and 
decisions in the simpler context of day-to-day transactions.  One 
context where such decisions routinely arise is the use of images of 
artworks, especially high-quality images that museums and other 
organizations make of the original art in their collections.  Though 
the law is unclear regarding copyright protection afforded to such 
images, many museum policies and licenses encumber the use of 
art images with terms of use and license restrictions.
1
 
Quality reproductions are critical to creating art history books 
or museum exhibition websites, and high-resolution and accurate 
photographic images can be expensive to produce.  Some museums 
find that supplying images can be an active and lucrative service, 
or at least the museum may strive to cover expenses.  Museums 
often assert rights of control over the images by means of 
copyright or contract and licensing terms.  This article explores the 
extent to which museums have strained the limits of copyright 
 
 1 Whatever the terms and conditions of use, museum policies can ultimately drive 
users to secure permissions for many uses, burdening research and the sharing of 
enjoyable and important works of art. Christopher Lyon, The Art Book’s Last Stand, ART 
IN AMERICA, Sept. 2006, at 51 (calling the process ―Permissions Purgatory‖). 
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claims and indeed have restructured concepts of ownership and 
control in ways that curtail the availability and use of art images 
far beyond anything that may be grounded in copyright law.
2
 
This analysis of museum policies examines the matter of 
overreaching by placing them in the context of copyright law.  Part 
II sets forth the background of this study through the collection and 
analysis of policies and license terms from major museums in the 
United States.  Part III lays a foundation of copyright law, 
including rights of use, duration of protection, and the limited 
protection of moral rights under American law.  Parts IV and V 
explore the challenge of policymaking at museums.  These sections 
identify the difficulties that museums face as they might seek to 
develop policies more conducive to meeting the needs of users, or 
that at least address the nuances of copyright law in service of the 
public interest in access to and use of art images. 
Part VI offers an original breakout of varieties of overreaching 
in museum policies.  While this section provides specific examples 
of museum practices as forms of overreaching, it also highlights 
examples of alternative approaches that museums have used to 
address the issue in a manner that better responds to copyright and 
the interest of users.  This study demonstrates that overreaching 
occurs in different forms, and that the pressures for overreaching 
are endemic in the law and in the exigencies of practical 
applications.  Nevertheless, policymakers have realistic 
alternatives for better standards, as this article will show. 
I. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
One of the central problems motivating this analysis is the 
potential conflict between the terms of museum policies and the 
educational and public interest objectives of the institution.
3
  On 
 
 2 For a study of the problem before the Bridgeman case reshaped much of the 
discussion about related copyright law, see generally Kathleen Connolly Butler, Keeping 
the World Safe from Naked-Chicks-In-Art Refrigerator Magnets: The Plot to Control Art 
Images in the Public Domain through Copyrights in Photographic and Digital 
Reproductions, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 55 (1998). 
 3 The tension was expressed in another way: 
As museums and cultural institutions throughout the world utilize 
multimedia technology to ‗open up‘ their collections to a worldwide 
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the one hand, the museum has a primary objective of informing the 
public about art and opening opportunities to understand and 
appreciate creative works.  On the other hand, museums often feel 
the pressure to set restrictions that ultimately limit access and 
confine uses of art images.  Policies reveal much about how 
museums choose to resolve that tension.
4
 
This paper is one outcome of a study of museum licensing 
practices funded by The Samuel H. Kress Foundation.
5
  The 
principal objective of the study has been to gather and analyze a 
sample of art museum policies and to examine their similarities 
and differences, producing a systematic inventory of the range of 
issues addressed in license agreements and the different ways in 
which museums respond to these issues.  Through analysis of 
diverse terms and conditions, this project has the potential to 
demonstrate options that museums have when drafting licenses, 
policies, and other terms of use to address specific concerns.
6
 
The study analyzes policy terms from a sample of art museums 
in the United States.  Fifty museums, each with a primary specialty 
in art were selected from the accredited members of the American 
Association of Museums.  The selected museums were chosen with 
an aim toward achieving a diverse sample in terms of the size and 
nature of their collections, the staffing and budget, and the scope of 
 
public in an effort to promote universal cultural development, 
directors of these institutions must balance new rights in valuable 
digital information assets with demands of an international audience 
and the ability of that audience to copy easily from digital media. 
Marilyn Phelan, Digital Dissemination of Cultural Information: Copyright, Publicity, and 
Licensing Issues in Cyberspace, 8 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 177, 180 (2001–02). 
 4 One study lays out the ―paradox‖ for museums: ―a situation characterized by 
competing impulses to broadcast images in furtherance of educative missions (and 
perhaps a reputation for high-tech sophistication) and to restrain the distribution of those 
images in order to preserve their economic value by reducing the risk of pirated copies.‖ 
Mitch Tuchman, Note, Inauthentic Works of Art: Why Bridgeman May Ultimately Be 
Irrelevant to Art Museums, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 287, 288 (2001). 
 5 For another publication resulting from the project, see Kenneth D. Crews & Melissa 
A. Brown, Control of Museum Art Images: The Reach and Limits of Copyright and 
Licensing, in THE STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CAN ONE SIZE FIT ALL? 
269 (Annette Kur & Vytautas Mizaras, eds., 2011). 
 6 Details about the background and other aspects of the Kress study are set forth in 
Kenneth Crews, Interim Report: Art Image Copyright and Licensing Study (June 29, 
2010), http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:128139. 
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their image licensing practices.  The Kress grant supported the 
detailed project of locating policy terms from almost all of the fifty 
identified institutions and isolating and organizing the terms in a 
manner that allows for a comparison of the specific language used 
in each.
7
 
This article focuses on selected provisions from the policies 
surveyed.  This study does not attempt to identify quantitatively 
measured trends in policymaking or museum practices, although 
examination of the terms does suggest that some provisions are 
comparatively common, and museum practices appear to trend in 
certain directions.  The methodology used in this study is aimed at 
identifying forms and varieties of policy practices and 
comprehending the substantive character and likely consequences 
of those provisions. 
The provisions analyzed are substantive terms established by 
the museums as conditions or requirements that the museum 
expects users to follow in exchange for the museum‘s consent for 
their use of the art images in question.  They are effectively the 
quid pro quo for permission to use.  The provisions may be 
presented as ―terms of use‖ or as formal license agreements.8  They 
may be labeled as ―policy‖ or as contractual language.  One 
museum may ask for formal consent from the user, and the next 
museum may state that users are deemed to consent to the terms by 
virtue of using the collection or the website.  In any event, the 
provisions reflect a decision by the museum that the terms are 
proper, and as a result the terms are akin to a policy choice.  This 
article will often use the label ―policy‖ to encompass all of these 
possibilities. 
 
 7 See Melissa A. Brown & Kenneth D. Crews, Art Image Copyright and Licensing: 
Compilation and Summary of Museum Policies (Mar. 8, 2010), available at 
http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:128159. 
 8 This article presumes that the provisions are enforceable, while one must 
acknowledge that there is an open question about the legally binding nature of ―terms of 
use‖ and related license terms. See generally, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 
1447 (7th Cir. 1996); see also infra note 73 (regarding a lawsuit filed against the 
Berkeley Historical Society). 
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II. BACKGROUND OF COPYRIGHT LAW 
A. Rights and Limitations 
The museum policies analyzed in this article are responsive to 
copyright issues, or at the least they purport to set standards for 
uses that are otherwise governed by copyright law.  
Fundamentally, copyright law grants a set of exclusive rights to the 
owner of the copyright.
9
  An artist, whether little known or world 
famous, may create a stunning new painting, and the law will 
generally grant automatic copyright protection to that artist with 
respect to that work.
10
  While copyright protection is extensive in 
many respects, it is also limited in others.  Copyright law grants the 
copyright owner a bundle of rights, such as the right to make 
reproductions and derivative works or to make public displays of 
those works.
11
  These rights are implicated when a museum makes 
or reproduces a digital image of an original painting.  The use of 
that image for a research study, a set of gift cards, or coffee mugs 
may also be considered a reproduction or a derivative work.
12
  
Simply putting the work on display in the museum may be a form 
of public display that violates the rights of the copyright owner.
13
 
The rights of the copyright owner are limited in many 
important ways.  First, not all rights apply to all works.  Most 
notably, sound recordings do not have full rights of public 
performance.
14
  Second, the rights are subject to limitations and 
 
 9 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
 10 Id. § 102(a). 
 11 Id. § 106. 
 12 The Copyright Act defines a derivative work as ―a work based upon one or more 
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, 
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, 
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.‖  
Id. § 101. 
 13 The concept of public display is defined broadly in the Copyright Act.  The most 
relevant part of the definition states, ―to perform or display it at a place open to the public 
or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a 
family and its social acquaintances is gathered . . . .‖ Id. § 101.  However, the public 
display right is sharply limited by an exception that allows the display of an authorized 
copy of the work, at the place where the copy is located, such as at a museum. Id. § 
109(c). 
 14 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 & 114 (2006). 
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exceptions, most notably fair use.
15
  The Copyright Act in the 
United States and in most countries includes several statutory 
provisions that create exceptions to the rights of copyright 
owners.
16
  Many of these exceptions are important in the context of 
art.  Fair use and some exceptions related to education and research 
can apply to artworks.
17
  Third, the rights under copyright are also 
limited in duration.  Copyrights do last for many years, indeed 
many decades, but they do eventually expire.
18
  The artistic 
accomplishments of recent artists, such as Andy Warhol or Roy 
Lichtenstein are surely under copyright protection.
19
  By 
comparison, Pablo Picasso began his artistic career in the late 
nineteenth century, and it extended until his death in 1973.  Many 
of his works are recent enough to still be under copyright 
protection, but some of his earliest pieces may be in the public 
domain.  We can be much more confident in concluding that the 
masterworks by Rembrandt, da Vinci, and other great artists from 
long ago are securely in the public domain and without any 
copyright protection.
20
 
 
 15 Fair use is codified at Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act, but other exceptions 
continue in Sections 108–22. See id. §§ 107–22. 
 16 Most countries have multiple statutory exceptions.  Often the exceptions apply to 
familiar activities, but the details of the statutes vary greatly from one country to the next.  
The author of this article conducted a study for WIPO, demonstrating that statutory 
exceptions for libraries are common in worldwide copyright laws, but the detailed 
provisions are hardly consistent. See generally Kenneth D. Crews, Study on Copyright 
Limitations and Exceptions for Libraries and Archives, WIPO (Aug. 26, 2008), 
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=109192. 
 17 For example, Section 108 allows libraries to make copies of certain works for 
preservation and replacement and for personal study and research.  The preservation and 
replacement provisions can apply to art and visual images; the research and study 
provisions do not apply to art, except art images that may be part of or an adjunct to a 
textual work. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 108(i) (2006).  Section 110 allows 
performances and displays of works in the classroom and in distance education, and with 
some conditions the statutes apply to art and visual images. Id. §§ 110(1), 110(2). 
 18 For the statutory provisions related to copyright duration, see id. §§ 301–05. 
 19 Warhol and Lichtenstein died in 1987 and 1997 respectively.  Given that copyrights 
in their works last for either seventy years after death, or ninety-five years after 
publication of the works (if publication occurred before 1978), then paintings by these 
artists are surely under copyright protection. Id. § 302. 
 20 Rembrandt van Rijn, lived from 1606 to 1669.  Leonardo da Vinci lived from 1452 
to 1519.  It would be an unusual law, indeed, that found continued copyright protection 
for their paintings.  However, copyright protection for works from centuries ago is not 
impossible. Peter Hirtle, The Search for the Oldest Copyrighted Work in the U.S. Goes on 
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Apart from this structure of economic rights are concepts of 
moral rights.
21
  While some countries have strong moral rights, the 
doctrine is sharply limited in the United States.  Congress amended 
the Copyright Act in 1990
22
 to add limited moral rights largely to 
seek compliance with the requirements of the Berne Convention, a 
multinational copyright agreement.
23
  American moral rights do 
apply to some works of art, making the concept relevant to many 
of the works governed by the museum policies analyzed in this 
article.
24
  Under U.S. law, moral rights give artists a legal right to 
prevent or recover damages for the intentional destruction or 
mutilation of some art works.
25
  Moral rights also give an artist the 
right to have his or her name on a work, or to remove the artist‘s 
name if the work has been altered in a manner that harms the 
artist‘s reputation.26  The statutory provision is rich with details, 
and it applies to only a narrow class of art works.  In essence, it 
establishes rights aimed at protecting the identity of the artist and 
the integrity of the art.
27
 
B.  Copyright and Art 
Except for the concepts of moral rights, the principles of 
copyright law apply to works of art in generally the same manner 
that they might apply to literary works, musical compositions, and 
 
. . . , LIBRARYLAW BLOG, http://blog.librarylaw.com/librarylaw/2010/04/the-search-for-
the-oldest-copyrighted-work-in-the-us-goes-on.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2012) 
(exploring the possibility of current copyright protection for a diary of John Adams from 
1753). 
 21 Principles of moral rights are examined in detail in other sources. See, e.g., Megan 
M. Carpenter, Drawing a Line in the Sand: Copyright Law and New Museums, 13 VAND. 
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 463, 483–91 (2011). 
 22 Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 601–10, 104 Stat. 5089 
(1990). 
 23 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 99-27 (1986), 1161 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 24 The scope of ―works of visual arts‖ is defined in detail to include only some works 
created in single copies or in numbered and signed print runs up to 200 copies, but also to 
exclude extensive categories for works, such as all works made for hire, and advertising 
materials, among other works. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 25 Id. § 106A(a)(2). 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. § 106A. 
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even software programs.
28
  In a few ways, however, copyright 
fundamentals do apply to art in some distinctive manner central to 
this study.  Some of those differences are overt examples of real 
and clear differences in the law.  Other differences arise from the 
context and the distinctive character of artworks.  When a scholar 
analyzing a literary or musical work, for example, needs to 
reproduce and scrutinize a particular work, many different 
published versions of the work may exist, and they may exist in 
multiple copies allowing often for easy availability.  Works of art 
are comparatively unique.
29
  When Vincent van Gogh makes a 
painting of irises, sunflowers, or a starry night, he would usually 
make only one single painting of that image.  Other artists often 
make multiple studies of the same subject matter, but each work 
has its own distinction separating one from the other.  When the 
need for a particular work of art arises, a reproduction or an 
alternate version may not suffice. 
Art is also different from many other types of copyrighted 
works because that one unique original is often in the possession of 
a party that maintains tight physical control over the work and 
access to it.
30
  Thus, one‘s ability simply to enjoy or to make a 
photographic reproduction of the work may depend on consent 
from the owner.  The copyright owner may have legal rights with 
respect to the protected expression in the artwork, but the owner of 
the physical object has control over any realistic ability to access 
and utilize the original work.  The control asserted by the owner of 
the physical object may bear no relationship to the copyright.  It 
may be asserted while the copyright is still in effect, and it may be 
asserted indefinitely, long beyond the expiration of the copyright.  
The ability to reproduce images of a Picasso hanging in the 
Museum of Modern Art may depend upon cooperation from the 
Picasso estate and from the museum.  The ability to reproduce 
 
 28 The principles of copyright and art are examined in other publications. See, e.g., 
Phelan, supra note 3, at 180–94. 
 29 The concepts of ―original‖ and ―copy‖ are the subject of considerable scholarly 
scrutiny. See generally Jeffrey Malkan, What is a Copy?, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
419 (2005). 
 30 ―In tangible terms, traditional memory institutions [including museums] were 
governed mostly by a paradigm of control over original authentic tangible cultural 
objects.‖ Guy Pessach, [Networked] Memory Institutions: Social Remembering, 
Privatization and Its Discontents, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 77 (2008). 
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medieval triptychs in the Metropolitan Museum of Art may not be 
constrained by copyright law, but it may well be controlled by the 
policies and practices of museum officials. 
Another reason for the distinctive treatment of art images as 
opposed to original works of art under copyright law is the fact that 
many art images comprise two or more copyrights.
31
  Copyright 
may or may not protect the original work of art, but copyright may 
subsist separately in a photographic reproduction of it.
32
  Almost 
any photograph, from a casual snapshot to a professional work of 
artistic accomplishment, is protectable by copyright in any 
conventional sense.
33
  For a photograph of a work of art, however, 
the court in Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corporation
34
 found 
that such direct photographic reproduction of a work of art is not 
eligible for copyright.
35
  The case was heard by the Southern 
District of New York, and the court labeled such two-dimensional 
copies as ―slavish‖ and determined that they lack sufficient 
originality and creativity to qualify for copyright protection.
36
 
 
 31 Guy Pessach, Museums, Digitization and Copyright Law—Taking Stock and 
Looking Ahead, 1 J. INT‘L MEDIA & ENT. L. 253, 276–77 (2007).  Sometimes the interests 
of the museum are in tension with the interests of the artist or other holder of the 
copyright in the original work.  One major association has offered a definition of fair use 
intended to encourage museums to exercise fair use of artworks, while acknowledging 
the right of the copyright owners. ASS‘N OF ART MUSEUM DIRS., AAMD POLICY ON THE 
USE OF ―THUMBNAIL‖ DIGITAL IMAGES IN MUSEUM ONLINE INITIATIVES (2011), published 
at 27 VISUAL RESOURCES 282 (2011). 
 32 A photographic reproduction could also, arguably at least, be a derivative of the 
original artwork. See Phelan, supra note 3, at 190–92. 
 33 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the nineteenth century that photographs could be 
protected under copyright law. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 
(1884). 
 34 See Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(holding that photographic painting replicas are not protected by copyright).   
 35 For a work to be copyrightable, it must include some minimum amount of creativity. 
Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 355 (1991). 
 36 Bridgeman, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 197.  In 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit, an appellate court with much greater legal jurisdiction, adopted the 
principles of Bridgeman in Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 
1258, 1270 (10th Cir. 2008).  In particular, the court held digital images of the basic 
design of existing automobiles did not have copyright protection. Id.; see also Oriental 
Art Printing, Inc. v. Goldstar Printing Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 542, 546–48 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (holding no copyright protection for photographs of familiar Chinese dinners on a 
restaurant menu). 
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One can readily see the significant reach of the Bridgeman 
decision, as well as its limits.  The ruling casts doubt on claims of 
copyright in the millions of photographic reproductions of two-
dimensional works of art.
37
  The case also undercuts the claims of 
legal protection to the livelihood of many professional 
photographers.  The craft of making high-quality photographs of 
art, and capturing the color and lighting of an original painting is a 
technique that requires extensive training and preparation as well 
as expensive equipment.  To deny the photographer legal 
protection for his or her labors may well erode the incentive to 
produce high-quality work and to make the resulting photographs 
widely accessible. 
Moreover, Bridgeman is arguably of limited legal scope.  A 
photographer would probably not have to add much to the 
photograph in order for it to be within the reach of copyright.  Any 
adjustment of angles or shadows, as well as inclusion of the frame 
and surrounding setting into the photograph would probably be 
enough to take the photograph beyond being a simple reproduction 
of the painting.  Further, the Bridgeman ruling was only about two-
dimensional works of art.  Almost any photograph of a sculptural 
work or other three-dimensional work will most likely include 
some background elements as well as choices of angles, 
shadowing, and lighting.  Those choices are probably sufficient to 
qualify the work for copyright protection.  For purposes of this 
study and its examination of the possible overreaching of copyright 
claims, the greatest interest lies with photography and other 
imaging of two-dimensional works of art.  It is with these types of 
works that the law casts the greatest doubt about claims of 
copyright protection.  It is also these types of works that are 
probably most in demand by scholars and researchers as they seek 
images to use in connection with their work. 
 
 37 See generally Karen D. Williams, Disparity in Copyright Protection: Focus on the 
Finished Image Ignores the Art in the Details, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 169 (2008) 
(recommending a more nuanced form of scrutiny of originality in different forms of 
graphical art works). 
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III. MUSEUM CLAIMS OF COPYRIGHT AND CONTROL 
A. Rights of Ownership 
Museums create a legal conundrum when they claim legal 
rights to control images, where copyright protection is doubtful at 
best.  The works in question—both the artwork and the 
reproduction—may be completely in the public domain.  
Nevertheless, museums often assert claims of copyright protection 
to the images.  If they are not in fact claiming copyright protection, 
they are often asserting levels of control over those works through 
contract or license terms associated with the work.  Some 
museums go further and assert levels of control simply through 
terms of use that purport to be binding on anyone accessing the 
images from a website or other source.  The museum that supplies 
the image is the party that is solely defining the terms of use, and it 
can do so based only on its ability to control access to the work.  
Yet the terms asserted are typically couched as if they were 
binding provisions of law.  The museum is the gatekeeper of 
access to the art and to the images; in its role as a gatekeeper, the 
museum is devising claims that may be overreaching. 
Controlling access to the original artwork is an outgrowth of 
the museum‘s possession of property, not of copyright.38  The 
museum can control access to the original artwork by means as 
simple and as obvious as locking the front doors.  The museum can 
decide who enters the premises and who can bring in the 
sophisticated photographic equipment to make the quality images.  
The museum then supplies those images at the request of 
researchers, teachers, publishers, and anyone else seeking to use it.  
A museum is certainly justified in asking for payment for services.  
Producing and delivering a quality image can be expensive.  
Contractual control over some uses is at least rational.  A museum 
may be deterred by the risks of releasing one image only to find 
that it has been shared publicly with no restriction, thereby 
undercutting any further incremental sales. 
 
 38 One museum director made this candid assessment: ―We control how our collection 
is used not through enforcement of copyright but by limiting access to reproducible 
images of it.  We can deny use to a publication that we think will not use the image 
appropriately.‖ Lyndel King, The Fair Use Dilemma, 75 MUSEUM NEWS 36, 37 (1997).   
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B. Downstream Control of Images 
The dynamic of the market transaction with the museum is 
actually much more complex.  The terms of the transaction and the 
restrictions on the use are vastly more elaborate, as will be detailed 
later in this article.  The transaction is deeply affected by the 
scarcity of access.  That fact, combined with the apparent validity 
of legalistic controls, leads to the perception of downstream control 
of subsequent uses.  In other words, an individual who acquires an 
image directly from a museum may in fact be contractually 
obligated to that museum and subject to any restrictive terms that 
the user accepted.  Because those restrictive terms shape the work 
and therefore the way it will be seen and found by readers and 
other subsequent users, the terms carry with them a perception of 
the control of all uses of that image—not only by the party in 
privity with its agreement with the museum.  Once establishing 
that perception of immediate and downstream control over the uses 
of the image, the continued control becomes operationalized in the 
language of museum priorities and the museum mission. 
The process of downstream control may be examined in more 
methodological steps.  First, the museum has control over the 
physical object.  By establishing and maintaining that 
unquestionable control over the unique physical artwork, the 
museum can clearly control the access to it.  The notion that the 
museum, which we assume for this purpose does not hold the 
copyright in the original artwork, is able to determine this level of 
control creates a perception that it has all rights.  In fact, the 
museum can, with few limits, demand that a photographer or other 
user of the work comply with all of its conditions and restrictions 
before it is permitted either to receive the image from the museum 
or be allowed to enter the premises in order to make a quality 
reproduction. 
 Second, because the museum controls the making and release 
of the initial reproduction of the artwork, it exercises that authority 
in turn to define restrictions in its terms of use applicable to 
subsequent users.  The terms in the agreement may define not only 
what the immediate user can do but also sharply restrict the ability 
to release the work for others.  If the terms of use define how the 
work may be presented in a textbook or other resource, those 
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restrictions further limit the ability of downstream users to find, 
acquire, and use versions of the work that they may need for their 
own purposes.  Because the first user needs the work and has 
resolved that having the work is sufficiently important, that user 
often finds himself or herself willing to accede to these restrictive 
terms. 
 Third, the restrictive terms are then articulated and reinforced 
by the museum in a manner that relates them to the mission of the 
institution.  The mission of a museum may be defined differently 
by each organization, but in general, most museums will define 
their purpose in terms of acquiring, preserving, and protecting the 
integrity of original art, while also facilitating the ability of the 
public to enjoy and learn from the cultural objects.  The restrictions 
on uses of images are arguably in furtherance of that museum by 
preventing uses that may be derogatory or otherwise detract from 
the preservation and promotion of the original artworks. 
C. Bridgeman and the Persistence of Copyright 
Although the Bridgeman ruling is more than a decade old, 
some museums continue to assert outright copyright protection.  It 
is not unusual in almost any industry for a provider of information 
resources to claim some form of protection or constraint on uses of 
the materials, as museums often do.  Yet bold statements of 
copyright protection run directly contrary to the decision in 
Bridgeman.
39
  The Art Institute of Chicago hosts a website that is 
rich with images that anyone with an Internet connection may 
access and enjoy.  However, the policy statement on the website 
explicitly provides, ―the text, images, data, audio, video, and other 
content on the site . . . are protected by copyright . . . .‖40 
This statement from the Asia Society Museum is even more 
explicit and more adamant: ―All material, including text and 
images, appearing on the Society‘s World Wide Web Site (the 
 
 39 See generally Mary Campbell Wojcik, The Antithesis of Originality: Bridgeman, 
Image Licensors, and the Public Domain, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 257, 276 
(2008) (―[I]mage licensors will persist in using the precedential ambiguity surrounding 
Judge Kaplan‘s decision to intimidate image users into submission‖). 
 40 Terms and Conditions, THE ART INST. OF CHI., http://www.artic.edu/aic/copyright. 
html (last visited Mar. 19, 2012). 
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‗Site‘) are the property of the Society, or used by permission, and 
are protected by United States and International Copyright Law 
and do not constitute material in the public domain.‖41  Generic 
assertions are also not uncommon, but these blanket provisions 
have the effect of concealing the public domain as identified in 
Bridgeman. 
Claims of copyright that might be called false, erroneous, or 
misleading are not unusual.  Recent scholarship has stirred fresh 
examination of ―copyright fraud‖ as a questionable technique used 
by claimants to make unjustified claims of legal protection in order 
to deter or discourage users at the least, or to collect royalties at the 
worst.
42
  On the other hand, one could rationalize these museum 
positions in a legitimate but technical manner by resolving that the 
Bridgeman decision, as a ruling from only one district court, 
applies only inside the jurisdiction of that district.
43
  The 
willingness of a claimant in another district to challenge that ruling 
by staking out a contrary position is a completely legitimate 
approach to testing the law. 
Thus, the Art Institute of Chicago may conclude that, because 
it is not in the same federal district as the Bridgeman court, a court 
in Chicago‘s district could resolve the issue differently and, until 
then, the museum will take its own position on copyright matters.  
This explanation of museum policy, however, does not hold up in 
the case of the Asia Society Museum, which is located in New 
York City.  That museum is located inside the boundaries of the 
jurisdiction of the Southern District of New York.  It is therefore 
inside the jurisdiction of the Bridgeman court.  One has to wonder 
if the Asia Society has taken its position specifically to challenge 
the law. 
 
 41 Terms and Conditions, ASIA SOCIETY, http://asiasociety.org/util/terms-conditions 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2012). 
 42 ―Copyfraud by archives, museums, and other not-for-profit institutions is especially 
troubling.  These entities are publicly supported through tax benefits, and often 
government grants, because their collections benefit the public.  We should be able to 
expect in return that public domain works be left in the public domain.‖ JASON MAZZONE, 
COPYFRAUD AND OTHER ABUSES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 18 (2011). 
 43 Most notably, the Tenth Circuit adopted the reasoning of Bridgeman in a case 
involving the imaging of automobile designs. See supra note 36. 
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D. The Risks of Constructive Policies 
What would motivate a museum to run counter to reasonably 
clear principles of copyright law?  Risks associated with 
noncompliance with the law have been examined in many other 
general contexts.  Many possible motivations could lead to this 
institutional decision.  For example, the museum may be 
continuing with old policy and simply has not taken the 
opportunity to give it a fresh review in the years since the 
Bridgeman decision.  Another possibility is that the museum 
believes that the Bridgeman ruling does not apply, and that its 
works and the circumstances are significantly different from the 
context of the Bridgeman decision. 
The one statement on the Asia Society website also broadly 
applies to all materials found on the site.  One can easily imagine 
that some materials on the site are in the public domain under the 
Bridgeman doctrine, while many other photographs and images 
may be legitimately protected under copyright.  The museum did 
not create an elaborate or detailed statement that sorts differences 
among the many images available on its website.  Instead the 
museum chose to make a broad statement up front, leaving details 
to be addressed later as needed. 
An additional and likely possibility is that the museum has 
been compelled to make a sweeping statement of strong copyright 
protection as a result of its relationships with artists, 
photographers, and other third parties.  Many copyright owners 
and creative individuals make their works available through 
museums and other organizations, but subject to rigorous 
conditions and restrictions.  A museum may choose to include on 
its public site strong statements of copyright protection in order to 
satisfy the requirements of donors and other individuals who have 
made their works available on that site.  Thus, accuracy in 
copyright standards becomes a bargaining chip in the decisions 
related to the acquisition and availability of art images. 
Consider one more example.  The Peabody Essex Museum 
provides images for purchase by individual users, with this general 
statement:  
[T]he purchase of a photograph, or scan, or a 
photographic image, or the transmission of an 
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electronic image, or the rental of a color 
transparency does not itself carry with it the right to 
publish, nor make a reproduction, scan, or transmit, 
broadcast, digitize, or otherwise make available in 
any form.
44
   
The sentence may be convoluted, but the point is clear.  The 
museum evidently is willing to sell photographic images of works 
of art and to creatively make them available through transmission, 
or scan, or rental, but any acquisition by any of these means does 
not include the right to publish an image or to make it more widely 
available in any form. 
The museum is not necessarily claiming copyright, but it is 
asserting an obvious restriction on subsequent uses and sharing of 
that image.  Apparently, the person acquiring the image may utilize 
it for personal or local uses such as teaching an art history course.  
However, if the person is seeking to use it in connection with any 
kind of publication or further sharing, then the user is expected to 
secure an additional license.  It may not be explicitly a claim of 
copyright, but it is absolutely a claim of rights and control akin to 
copyright and perhaps expected to trump copyright. 
The difficulty of drafting more precise or open museum 
policies is especially evident when considering policies that could 
actually confirm that users have rights to use the materials in 
question.  Examined later in this article is a technique used by The 
Getty to specify that it has found ―No Known Copyright 
Restrictions‖ with respect to specific images.  Such conclusions are 
enormously beneficial to users, but could pose formidable 
challenges for policymakers.  On the one hand, identifying a work 
as public domain is honest and helpful.  Yet making such a public 
statement is to offer a legal conclusion; thus museum lawyers may 
at least hesitate when considering the possibility of a legal 
challenge should the determination prove wrong. 
The dilemma is quickly exacerbated in the online environment, 
where a statement of ―public domain‖ could prove false under the 
 
 44 Melissa A. Brown & Kenneth D. Crews, Art Image Copyright and Licensing: Terms 
and Conditions Governing Reproduction and Distribution, at 6 (2010), http://academic 
commons.columbia.edu/item/ac:128142. 
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laws of a country with different rules and laws, but where many 
users may be located.
45
  One can easily see that the temptation to 
be simple and even overreaching grows as the law becomes more 
complex, as the environment becomes more international, and as 
beneficial statements hold the prospect of generating new 
responsibilities and potential liabilities.  Against these challenges, 
museums must strive to find the right course. 
IV. RATIONALE FOR RESTRICTIVE POLICYMAKING 
A. Convergence of Causes 
While this article is clearly critical of museum policies that are 
overreaching, the pressures leading to such policies are not without 
some rationale.  The previous section of this article noted the legal 
reasons why a museum might be reluctant to soften its approach 
and make more definitive statements about the public domain 
status of a work.  Yet the terms of museum policies often embrace 
more than whether or not a work is copyrighted.  The same legal 
reluctance about clarifying rights does not explain why a museum 
would choose to actively create new restrictions related to formal 
credit or alterations of the image. 
Why would a museum want to make a policy that sets 
restrictions regardless of what the law allows?
46
  This study 
 
 45 See Lara Ortega, How to Get The Mona Lisa in Your Home Without Breaking the 
Law: Painting a Picture of Copyright Issues with Digitally Accessible Museum 
Collections, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 567, 580–82 (2011) (examining an exception in the 
Australian Copyright Act allowing cultural institutions to make some reproductions, but 
only within severe constraints); Emily Hudson & Andrew T. Kenyon, Digital Access: 
The Impact of Copyright on Digitisation Practices in Australian Museums, Galleries, 
Libraries and Archives, 30 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 12, 13 (2007) (finding that Australian 
copyright exceptions support some digital reproduction of works by museums and 
galleries, but do not facilitate a general public framework for online access to copyrighted 
materials); see also Keith Wotherspoon, Copyright Issues Facing Galleries and 
Museums, 25 EURO. INTELL. PROP. REV. 34–39 (2003) (suggesting that the United 
Kingdom would follow the reasoning in Bridgeman, in which reproductions of artistic 
images that museums create and market to third parties would not garner copyright 
protection). 
 46 In many other disciplines, copyright owners have in fact chosen to relinquish rights 
that they clearly have under the law to make the work more widely available.  The 
movement towards open access of scientific literature and the adoption of Creative 
Commons licenses are innovations in the management of intellectual property that seek to 
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suggests that the motivations largely center around four concepts.  
First, museums have an interest in protecting the integrity of art.
47
  
Many museums primarily see themselves as effectively the trustee 
of the aesthetic works.  The museums see the need to control uses 
including alterations and variations on the artworks by subsequent 
users in order to protect the integrity of the image as the artist may 
have conceived it.
48
  Second, restricted uses can drive researchers 
and others back to the museum for consent to subsequent uses, 
with additional fees payable to the museum.
49
  Licensing of images 
and the sale of posters, note cards, and other products based on the 
artworks within museum collections can be essential sources of 
income.
50
 
These financial prospects are not to be dismissed lightly.
51
  
Museums are an anchor of our cultural heritage and should be 
supported.  Further, the museum should also be supported with our 
contributions, our donations, and our purchases of worthwhile 
products at the gift shop.
52
  Controls and restrictions over uses of 
the images have the possibility of not only protecting the integrity 
of the works, but also allowing uses that are monitored by the 
 
reduce barriers to access and use of creative materials.  The tendency of many museums 
to assert greater control on copyrighted materials is contrary to the growing open access 
perspective on intellectual property rights.  Some museums have embraced open access 
for images.  The National Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C. announced in March 2012 
a new policy of open access for images of artworks that are in the public domain. NGA 
Images, a New Collection Image Resource, and Open Access Policy Launched by 
National Gallery Of Art, Washington, NAT‘L GALLERY OF ART, http://www.nga.gov 
/press/2012/nga_images.shtm  (last visited Apr. 16, 2012). 
 47 See Carpenter, supra note 21, at 468–70 (describing museums as keepers of history). 
 48 Robin J. Allan, After Bridgeman: Copyright, Museums, and Public Domain Works 
of Art, 155 U. PA. L.R. 961, 982–83 (2007). 
 49 Colin T. Cameron, In Defiance of Bridgeman: Claiming Copyright in Photographic 
Reproductions of Public Domain Works, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 31, 59–60 (2006) 
(―An assumption implied in construing the motivation to claim copyright in photographic 
reproductions of public domain paintings is that the additional control creates an 
opportunity to generate more revenue.‖). 
 50 See generally Richard Shone, Copyright, Fair or Foul?, 148 BURLINGTON MAG. 659 
(Oct. 2006). 
 51 The leading museum association in the U.S. has done extensive surveying of 
member practices and fees from licensing. See AM. ASS‘N OF MUSEUMS, AAM MEMBER 
MUSEUMS RIGHTS & REPRODUCTIONS SURVEY (2004), available at http://www.panix.com 
/~squigle/rarin/RCAAMSurvey2003-4.pdf. 
 52 See Carpenter, supra note 21, at 475. 
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museum and that have the prospect of coming back to the museum, 
benefiting its bottom line.
53
 
As important as these first two reasons may be to the museum 
and possibly to the artists, this article will center on a third and 
fourth reasons.  The third is that museums, like libraries and other 
organizations, want credit for their collections and other good 
work.
54
  A museum policy can condition use on credit to the artist 
and to the institution.  The fourth reason is for adherence to donor 
requirements.  Many collections come to museums as donations or 
sales with conditions in the original transaction; a policy can 
extend those agreed conditions to the user.  In reality, an individual 
museum policy may be shaped by a blend of different motivations 
and justifications.  This paper offers a closer examination of these 
last two justifications. 
B.  Donor Restrictions and Museum Policies 
Museum policy restrictions are often justified as required by 
donor agreements.  Museum benefactors sometimes set terms of 
use for artworks and other materials that they donate or sell to the 
museum.  If the museum accepts the terms, the restrictions are then 
contractually passed along to users.  Museums should view donor 
restrictions as a price paid for the materials in question, and it is a 
price often borne by the public in the form of limited access or 
uses.  Like any price, the museum should actively seek to keep it 
as low as possible. 
Museum policies frequently refer explicitly to donor and third 
party interests.  Consider this statement from the Huntington 
Library: ―permission to reproduce images . . . is granted when the 
use of the materials in publications, in any format . . . complies 
 
 53 See SIMON TANNER, REPRODUCTION CHARGING MODELS AND RIGHTS POLICY FOR 
DIGITAL IMAGES IN AMERICAN ART MUSEUMS: A MELLON FOUNDATION STUDY 40 (2004), 
available at http://msc.mellon.org/research-reports/Reproduction%20charging%20 
models%20and%20rights%20policy.pdf/view (questioning the prospect that museums 
can or should make significant income from licensing). 
 54 The U.S. Supreme Court clarified that there is no right under the law of unfair 
competition for the original author to be credited as the sources of materials that have 
entered the public domain. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 
23, 32, 37 (2003). 
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with any donor agreements attached to the materials.‖55  If the 
underlying work is in fact protected by copyright, such as many 
modern artworks surely are, then museums are acting wisely to 
caution users that permission from the museum is not sufficient to 
address any need for permission from the artist or any other rights 
holder. 
Giving users a word of caution is actually good policy, yet the 
role of donors is more complicated.  If an artist holds copyright in 
a work, that copyright can be researched and confirmed.  If a 
painting dates from the 1950s, and the artist died in the 1980s, we 
can undertake basic research and conclude with a high level of 
certainty that the work is currently protected by copyright, and the 
copyright will expire typically seventy years after the death of the 
artist or perhaps as of some other date depending on whether or 
when the work may have been published.  The research may be a 
bit complicated.  The legal conclusion may be a set of choices.  
Nevertheless the user has at least narrowed the possibilities and 
can proceed with the next steps. 
By sharp contrast, the rights and claims and obligations 
associated with donor agreements are strictly private matters 
between the donor and the museum.  An outside user of the image 
has no ability to know the facts of the donor transaction, and the 
museum may have reasons not to share that private business 
transaction with all of its details.  The user‘s only recourse when 
faced with the possibility of donor restrictions on the use of images 
is to ask the museum and accept the response and conditions that 
the museum may provide.  This is not to suggest that museums are 
somehow being insidious or devious in their approach to these 
matters.  The reality is often quite the contrary. 
In furtherance of the museum mission to preserve and make 
certain artworks available, the museum may have little realistic 
choice but to accept some of the conditions asserted by donors.  If 
the donor puts restrictions on reproductions and uses of the image, 
and insists that the donor‘s name or other statement be used in 
association with the images, the museum may find itself willing to 
 
 55 Permission to Publish Policy, HUNTINGTON LIBR., ART COLLECTIONS & BOTANICAL 
GARDEN, available at http://www.huntington.org/huntingtonlibrary.aspx?id= 590 (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2012). 
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comply with the restrictions in order to obtain important 
collections.  One can wish that donors would not set severe 
restrictions, or that museums could convincingly make the case to 
the donor about the resulting problems, but unfortunately the final 
transaction is often subject to conditions and restrictions which in 
turn get passed along to the individual users. 
C. Credit and Reputation 
An additional motivation for a museum‘s conditions on the use 
of images goes to the identification and reputation of the museum 
or of the artist.  Creative people often and understandably want 
credit for their work.  Without question, good practice associated 
with the uses of images in teaching, scholarship, or publishing 
would almost always call for properly identifying the work, the 
artist, and in most instances the museum and other source of the 
photographic reproduction.  Due credit is often one the highest 
priority concerns of a museum and artist.  Little in the law, 
however, addresses the issue in any direct way.
56
 
One aspect of moral rights—the paternity right—is the right of 
an author or artist to be identified in connection with uses of the 
copyrighted work.  That requirement exists in American copyright 
law for some works of art in a tightly limited fashion.  For 
example, moral rights apply only to works of visual art that are 
produced in 200 copies or fewer.
57
  The law ultimately gives the 
artist the legal right to call for his or her name to be on the work, 
but it places with the artist the duty to bring a legal action in order 
to enforce this right.
58
  Few artists have the wherewithal to hire 
lawyers and bring an action.  One would like to expect that most 
 
 56 Concepts of credit seldom appear in copyright law.  One example other than moral 
rights is the prohibition against removal of ―copyright management information,‖ which 
is defined in part to include the identity of the author of a work. See Copyright Act of 
1976, 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c) (2006). 
 57 For the definition of ―works of visual art‖ that have the benefit of moral rights, see 
id. § 101 (2006). 
 58 Few court rulings on moral rights have been handed down since the law was enacted 
in 1990.  One significant ruling is Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 611–12, 
615 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that the intentional destruction of a public sculpture on city 
property was a violation of moral rights, but did not amount to a ―willful‖ violation of 
VARA). 
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users would also gladly add the appropriate credit if the lack of an 
artist‘s identification is brought to the user‘s attention. 
Rather than relegate this issue to the nuances and the expense 
of copyright law, artists and authors sometimes include a 
requirement of attribution in contracts for the sale, transfer, or 
other use of the work.  Such attribution requirements appear in 
publication agreements, and they are a staple of Creative 
Commons licenses.
59
  Museums—as well as libraries and other 
organizations—similarly condition many of their services on 
receiving credit in return from the user.  While moral rights are 
statutorily binding on all users, contractual obligations are 
generally binding only on the parties to the transaction. 
Moral rights may also be asserted only by authors, but 
contractual obligations can at least be pressed or negotiated by 
anyone.
60
  Museums typically do not own the copyright in the 
individual items held in the collections, and moral rights are not 
transferrable in any event.  Without a legal right to expect credit, 
museums sometimes make statements of credit part of the 
exchange for access to the collections and use of the images.  
Museums clearly want the world to know that they possess 
collections of research value and use those materials to support 
further scholarship. 
The desire to enhance one‘s reputation can easily migrate from 
asking for credit to asserting control over exactly how credit is 
ascribed.  If a museum were to borrow concepts from the doctrine 
of moral rights, the museum may ask for appropriate credit and 
identification of the museum as the source of the work.  The 
museum may also ask for the right to remove its name from a use 
to which the museum may object.  Removal of one‘s name is also 
consistent with a moral rights doctrine that seeks to preserve or 
promote the good reputation of creative individuals. 
The Georgia O‘Keeffe Museum takes what appears to be an 
extra step into the hazardous arena of control and supervision of 
the downstream uses of the art images.  According to the 
 
 59 About, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/about (last visited Mar. 24, 
2012) (providing more information regarding Creative Commons licenses). 
 60 Under American law, only the artist has moral rights. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 
U.S.C. § 106A(e) (2006) (providing that moral rights may not be transferred). 
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museum‘s policy: ―The Georgia O‘Keeffe Museum will be 
generous in granting permission to reproduce works it controls, 
particularly if the request is for an article or book that will promote 
Georgia O‘Keeffe‘s art and the worldwide knowledge of it.‖61  On 
its face, this statement is positive in various respects.  The museum 
will be generous.  The museum will grant permission for 
potentially diverse uses.  The museum will be especially generous 
when the uses support knowledge and understanding of O‘Keeffe‘s 
work. 
On the other hand, the suggestion of a substantive standard for 
the museum‘s permission opens the policy to a negative reading as 
a possible interference with critical examination of O‘Keeffe.  The 
policy does not explicitly provide that the museum will interfere 
with uses that are inconsistent with a particular perception of 
O‘Keeffe‘s art.  Yet the policy does suggest that the museum will 
be much more willing to grant permission if the use is in 
connection with a study that advances O‘Keeffe‘s art and 
understanding of it—perhaps advancing that understanding in a 
manner consistent with the museum‘s views.  At the least, the 
museum has tied its willingness to grant permission to the 
substantive context of the use of the work.  This step is an overt 
stride by the museum to foster studies that are subject to review by 
museum officials when permission is requested.  At its core, this 
provision exposes a museum‘s interest in using the control of 
images to enhance the reputation of the museum as the source of 
the work as well as the reputation of the artist as the creator of 
important cultural contributions. 
V. IMPLICATIONS AND VARIETIES OF OVERREACHING 
A. Practical and Legal Consequences 
Overreaching and assertion of rights and control through 
museum policies can have multiple adverse practical and legal 
consequences.  From the perspective of legal policy, these 
standards from museums are often an extension of copyright 
 
 61 Press/Media Guidelines, GEORGIA O‘KEEFFE MUSEUM, http://www.okeeffemuseum. 
org/requests.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2012). 
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protection beyond the limits of the law.  Copyright law is a form of 
legal rights, subject to limitations, that is developed slowly and 
meticulously by Congress and the courts, exploring the competing 
interests of rights holders and users.  The result may be a 
complicated and nuanced law, but it is also a law that reflects 
decisions made by lawmakers as they struggle with individual 
cases and are held accountable to the public in general for the 
implications of their decisions in the next situation.  Probably no 
one would declare the body of copyright law perfect, but by having 
been cultivated through legislation and litigation, copyright at least 
has the promise of reflecting diverse interests and pressures. 
When individuals or organizations unilaterally set policy terms 
regarding the use of materials, they are in effect crafting rules and 
restrictions that are not necessarily accountable to anyone other 
than themselves.  If the realistic ability to obtain images of unique 
works of art is within the museum‘s control, then the museum‘s 
unilateral restrictions become quasi-copyright standards for the 
public‘s ability to use a specific image.  If a large number of 
museums set widely divergent rules and standards, as is in fact the 
case, the result is not merely the diminished usability of an 
individual work, but instead an array of diverse and befuddling 
barriers that conspire to confuse researchers and further complicate 
the pressures on researchers who are drawing upon images from 
several museums for a single project. 
A further critical consequence of restrictive policies is the 
threat to the public domain.  Museum images may be in the public 
domain because, among other reasons, the copyrights eventually 
expire or the photographic reproductions are not copyrightable at 
all under Bridgeman.  Any assertion of control by the museum is a 
threat to core principles of the law: copyright protection is limited, 
and the public domain also supports creativity.  Copyright law 
exists to encourage the promotion of creating and sharing new 
works.  The law operates on the theory that granting legal rights to 
authors encourages authors to create new works and to make those 
works publicly available.  Similarly, the public domain enables 
other members of the public to benefit from and use those works in 
ways the author may not have anticipated and may not have 
wanted.  The public domain fosters innovation by allowing the 
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public at large to use the works and to create the next generation of 
knowledge and aesthetics. 
Sometimes the use of a public domain work is straight 
reproduction, which can serve the purpose of educating and 
informing readers about the materials.  In other situations, 
especially involving art, the works may be altered or modified in 
their next incarnation.  New art rarely exists in isolation.  Instead, 
new art is routinely built upon the creative work of artists who 
came before.  When a museum constrains the public domain, it is 
inhibiting new creativity and scholarly exploration.  Any burden on 
the public domain is also in direct defiance of a central premise of 
copyright law.  The museum may very well be fulfilling a mission 
of preserving the integrity of existing art, but it is not serving the 
public interest in the advancement of either art or the law. 
While the conditions on single images may be manageable in 
isolation, the reality is that scholarly pursuits often require multiple 
images from multiple sources.  Each restrictive museum policy 
thus adds to the immediate burden on scholarship, publishing, and 
other means for the public to find and appreciate works of art that 
are vital for understanding culture and aesthetic development.  The 
fees alone that many museums charge for the use of works can be 
modest on an individual basis, but collectively they can impose an 
extraordinarily high cost for a publication that includes multiple 
images. 
If images are removed from the publication because of costs, 
the loss to readers and scholars is obvious.  If the restrictions and 
conditions from museums prevent scholarly inquiry, then the study 
of art history and technique are inhibited.  For example, art 
scholarship often calls for the use of detailed excerpts from the 
larger work, or the experimentation with color and lighting to 
achieve new understandings of the elements of a painting or a 
sculptural work.  Many museum licenses would bar exactly these 
activities. 
B. Varieties of Overreaching 
From the museum‘s perspective, the license and policy terms 
may be simply an effort to prevent undesirable uses and perhaps to 
collect revenues in exchange for permissions.  From the 
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perspective of copyright standards, by sharp contrast, the policies 
often represent multiple forms of overreaching.  Of course, not 
every museum is susceptible to charges of overreaching, and some 
restrictions on use might be justified in different ways. 
Nevertheless, any restrictions beyond the reach of copyright 
are in defiance of the law and the social and intellectual objectives 
that copyright aims to serve.  An examination of selected standards 
in effect at major museums suggests patterns among documents, 
but also distinct forms of copyright overreaching.  Four types are 
especially prevalent and have critical implications for users.  They 
are identified here, with examples.  While such an examination of 
museum policies is inevitably a challenge to and critique of them, 
this article also strives to give examples of museum standards that 
address issues in a constructive manner and that avoid negative 
consequences. 
1. Asserting Rights to the Public Domain 
Copyright claims to works that are or may likely be in the 
public domain occur in at least two common situations.  A museum 
may assert claims that are beyond the scope of copyright.  
Examples arise when a museum claims copyrights that are cast in 
doubt by the ruling in the Bridgeman case.  A second situation 
would arise when a museum places a generic statement of 
copyright on a website or image collection, taking the efficient 
route to claim the copyright, but in the process sweeping with it 
elements and pieces that even the museum would agree are outside 
the bounds of copyright law.  The clearest form of this assertion 
would be an all-encompassing policy statement that disregards the 
basic fact that copyrights expire.  A general claim that embraces 
ancient works obviously ignores copyright fundamentals.  Such 
assertions are unfortunately common practice. 
Consider a few examples of broad assertions of copyright.  The 
Harvard Art Museums website includes a statement that is a staple 
among many museums policies: 
The Site and much of the text, images, graphics, 
audio and video clips, information and other content 
of the Site (collectively, the ―Content‖) are 
protected by copyright, trademark and other laws. 
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We and applicable third parties own the copyright 
and other rights in the Site and the Content. You 
may use the Site and the Content only in the manner 
and for the purposes specified in these Terms of 
Use.
62
 
The Museum of Fine Art Boston offers a more succinct and 
explanatory version: ―Text and images on the MFA‘s Web site, 
mfa.org—created as a public educational resource—are the 
property of the MFA and are protected by copyright.‖63  Chances 
are good that some image in an extensive and dynamic collection 
is in the public domain, which would technically disprove the 
museum‘s statement and convert it into a form of overreaching.  
Even without a quest for some elusive example, such statements 
are overreaching if in fact the Bridgeman doctrine applies.  The 
MFA confronts that possibility directly: ―The Images depict 
objects from the MFA‘s collection in a manner expressing the 
scholarly and aesthetic views of the MFA.  The Images are not 
simple reproductions of the works depicted and are protected by 
copyright.‖64 
This statement from MFA makes clear that the museum sees its 
images as much more than the ―slavish‖ reproductions envisioned 
by the Bridgeman court.  The MFA has gone even further than the 
Asia Society; where the Asia Society claims only a copyright, the 
MFA uses its terms in an apparent attempt to rationalize the claim 
by evidently distinguishing the Bridgeman case.  A museum is not 
likely to concede that its policy is overreaching, and the MFA 
could, from its perspective, view its policy as merely reiterating the 
law: if the images are not mere reproductions, and include some 
creative expression, they are distinguishable from the images in 
Bridgeman and ultimately protectable. 
 
 62 Terms of Use, HARVARD ART MUSEUMS, http://www.harvardartmuseums.org 
/home/terms_of_use.dot (last updated Apr. 12, 2011). 
 63 Web Use and Gallery Photography, MUSEUM OF FINE ARTS BOSTON, http://stage. 
mfa.org/collections/mfa-images/web-use-and-gallery-photography (last visited Mar. 24, 
2012). 
 64 Terms and Conditions, MUSEUM OF FINE ARTS BOSTON, http://www.mfa.org 
/collections/mfa-images/terms-and-conditions (last visited Mar. 24, 2012). 
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A more helpful policy would not necessarily assert rights, but 
would instead identify when works enter the public domain.
65
  
Guidance about the duration of copyright protection can give users 
a clear signal that the public domain exists and may apply to the 
particular work in question.  The Getty takes this path and offers 
users a detailed set of terms related to the rights of third parties.  In 
particular, The Getty expressly adopts the ―No Known Copyright 
Restrictions‖ statement for some of the works that it has identified 
as likely to exist in the public domain.
66
 
At the very least, the statement suggests that The Getty has 
investigated the work—implicitly under U.S. law—and that the 
museum itself is not asserting any claims.  Users are not directly 
told that the work is in the public domain.  However, the museum 
removed a few practical barriers to public uses of the works and 
likely alleviated a variety of risks and concerns.  Although this 
statement is not quite a declaration that the work is in the public 
domain, some museum policymakers may be reticent to make even 
this suggestion about the legal status of the work, as explored 
earlier in this article. 
2. Asserting Legal Rights that the Museum Does Not Hold 
In some respects, this form of overreaching may be the most 
difficult to identify among the policy provisions, but it may be the 
most justifiable.
67
  The previous category of overreaching involves 
assertions of rights where no rights exist.  This category entails 
assertions by the museum to rights that may be legitimate, but are 
held by others.  On the surface, if any party holds a legitimate 
copyright, and the museum standard calls for adherence to the 
 
 65 According to an official at The Getty, ―For reasons that seem too frequently 
unexamined, many museums erect barriers that contribute to keeping quality images of 
public domain works out of the hands of the general public, of educators, and of the 
general milieu of creativity.‖ Kenneth Hamma, Public Domain Art in an Age of Easier 
Mechanical Reproducibility, D-LIB MAG. (Nov. 2005), http://www.dlib.org/dlib/ 
november05/hamma/11hamma.html. 
 66 Terms of Use/Copyright, THE GETTY, http://www.getty.edu/legal/copyright.html 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2012). 
 67 Museums typically do not hold the copyrights in the works of art, and occasionally a 
dispute arises between the museum and the rights holder. See Mary Campbell Wojcik, 
The Antithesis of Originality: Bridgeman, Image Licensors, and the Public Domain, 30 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 257, 271–75 (2008). 
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legal rights, then the terms of use are little more than a reiteration 
of the status quo.  If the museum‘s terms include broad statements 
of copyright protection, then assertions on behalf of third parties 
within may be merely an expedient way to articulate possible 
diverse claims of rights. 
The assertion may arise indirectly whenever a museum 
stipulates that users need permission from the museum solely 
because the museum possesses the artwork or other object.  The 
Guggenheim Museum explicitly requires permission from the 
museum in addition to any legal permission that may be necessary 
from the copyright owner: 
The Guggenheim Museum is a contemporary art 
museum and therefore most of our works are still in 
copyright as an artwork remains the intellectual 
property of the artist and/or artist‘s estate for 70 
years after the artist‘s death.  This means that 
permission to use the artwork must be obtained 
from the copyright owner as well as from the 
Guggenheim and that additional fees may apply.
68
 
If the goal is to assure recognition or credit to the museum, 
more direct and efficient alternatives are available.  If the goal is to 
assure that all necessary permissions are sought—and occasionally 
the museum does hold the copyright—a less sweeping approach is 
possible.  Some museums do employ more flexible provisions that 
call users‘ attention to the copyright issues without risks of 
overreaching.  A statement that materials may have copyright, and 
that clearance from the rights holder may be in order, is not 
overreaching.  It is a simple and helpful statement of fact.  The 
Carnegie Museum of Art takes this approach: ―Carnegie Museum 
of Art does not hold copyright for most images in the collection; 
copyright clearance must be obtained by the applicant.‖69  The 
implied message is that copyright permission must be obtained—if 
legally warranted. 
 
 68 To Use Guggenheim Images, GUGGENHEIM, http://www.guggenheim.org/index.php? 
option=com_content&view=article&id=49&Itemid=99 (last visited Mar. 29, 2012). 
 69 Rights and Reproductions, CARNEGIE MUSEUM OF ART, http://web.cmoa.org 
/?page_id=69 (last visited Mar. 29, 2012). 
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The Carnegie statement is easily defensible as a matter of fact.  
If copyright clearance is needed, the user has to obtain it.  The 
Georgia Museum of Art (―GMOA‖) seems intent on taking a 
similar stance, with a bit more explanation: 
[GMOA] can grant permissions only to the extent of 
its ownership of the rights relating to the request.  
Certain works of art, as well as the photographs of 
those works of art, may be protected by copyright, 
trademark, or related interests not owned by 
[GMOA].  The responsibility of ascertaining 
whether any such rights exist and for obtaining all 
other necessary permissions remains with the 
applicant.  Written notification of permissions 
granted by other copyright holders must be 
submitted in advance to GMOA.
70
 
GMOA goes to some detail to clarify that it may not hold all 
legal rights associated with works and images from the collections.  
That explicit clarification is an important step toward explaining 
the application of the law.  However, GMOA equivocates by 
including the final sentence which does not state that permissions 
are necessary; it requires any written permissions to be submitted 
to the museum, presumably for some form of review, critique, or 
approval.  Whatever the purpose, the last sentence quoted above 
interjects the museum into the permissions process, even after 
acknowledging that the museum may not hold rights. 
In some respects, a policy calling for permissions is the mirror 
image of the ―No Known Copyright Restrictions‖ statement 
described in the previous section.  It is a way of suggesting that 
some copyright restrictions do apply.  Even without details, simply 
making that declaration—presumably accurately—is a constructive 
heads up to users that copyright investigation and clearance may be 
warranted.  The policy becomes overreaching when it requires 
permission in all cases, and when that permission must be from the 
museum that does not necessarily hold the legal rights. 
 
 70 Rights and Reproductions, GA. MUSEUM OF ART, http://www.georgia 
museum.org/art/rights-and-reproductions (last visited Mar. 29, 2012). 
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3. Asserting Rights Beyond Copyright 
Copyright law grants broad rights of control, but it does not 
grant all rights.  It is not unusual in any industry to leverage finite 
intellectual property rights for additional gain.  For example, 
copyright generally does not provide a right to payment, but 
copyright owners routinely license or transfer their legal rights in 
exchange for money.  Similarly, authors and other rights holders 
frequently grant copyright licenses in exchange for meeting a 
range of conditions—from precise statements of credit to 
restrictions on territory, duration, quantity, or other circumstances 
of use.  These limits become problematic when they unduly burden 
customary and beneficial uses of art images, or when the 
conditions are so complex or wide reaching that they distort a 
conventional sense of the copyright trade off.  Difficulties are 
further compounded when the terms cannot be negotiated and 
purport to rigidly burden researchers and other users. 
Museum policies often set forth ostensibly non-negotiable 
terms that attempt to limit uses in ways far beyond what copyright 
law specifically allows.  Even some of the most conventional 
terms, borrowed from years of experience with licensing and 
publishing, are in this category.  The Brooklyn Museum of Art 
stipulates: ―Permission fees are applicable for one-time 
reproduction rights in one language, one edition only unless 
otherwise negotiated.‖71  Similar clauses are standard in licensing 
practice.  Viewed another way, these clauses are an inherent barrier 
on the advancement of scholarship.
72
  If an author or publisher 
needs to return to the source for renewed permission with each 
edition or translation, the ability to move ahead with updated and 
revised versions of a publication is obviously circumscribed.
73
 
 
 71  Image Services Fee Schedule, BROOKLYN MUSEUM, http://www.brooklynmuseum. 
org/uploads/Image_Services_Fee_Schedule.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2012). 
 72 An early study of museum licenses stated, ―The one-time license method of 
acquiring rights to reproduce images is outmoded in an age of rapidly advancing 
technology.‖ Kim L. Milone, Dithering Over Digitization: International Copyright and 
Licensing Agreements Between Museums, Artists, and New Media Publishers, 5 IND. 
INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 393, 396 (1995). 
 73 A lawsuit was filed against the Berkeley Historical Society testing the enforceability 
of a restriction of one-time use with respect to public domain images supplied by the 
society.  The case was reportedly settled.  Some reflections from individuals close to the 
case are included in comments at Mary Minow, Berkeley Historical Society Lawsuit, 
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Restrictions are also commonly drafted around technological 
specifications.  The Carnegie Museum of Art provides: ―Digital 
reproductions must be low-resolution . . . and/or password 
protected . . . ; CD-DVDs must employ encryption protections.‖74  
Several museums state exact limits on the resolution or size of 
images used in printed works and on websites.  The Brooklyn 
Museum of Art stipulates: ―Digital reproductions must be low 
resolution.  When permission is granted for web sites, the image 
can be no larger than 800 pixels on the longest side.‖75 
The Ringling Museum of Art requires approval of any color 
reproductions of image proofs from the museum.
76
  It is hardly 
alone in requiring oversight of coloring.  The Frick Collection sets 
standards for color and even paper: ―No reproduction may be 
printed on colored stock, and black-and-white photographs may 
not be printed with colored ink.‖77  The Portland Art Museum adds 
further conditions: ―The reproduction must not be cropped, bled 
off the page, printed on color stock, or with colored ink, nor have 
anything superimposed on the image.‖78 
These examples are hardly uncommon.  They are indicative of 
the ability of museums to use one element of control to bargain for 
more.  They also reveal that copyright law itself is far from 
addressing many of the issues that concern museums.  This article 
has argued that some art images are correctly in the public domain.  
Even assuming that the images are not in the public domain and 
that the museum holds the copyright, the policy statements affirm 
 
LIBRARYLAW BLOG (Aug. 25, 2005), http://blog.librarylaw.com/librarylaw/2005/ 
08/can_a_library_m.html. 
 74 Fee Schedule, CARNEGIE MUSEUM OF ART, http://web.cmoa.org/?page_id=253 (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2012). 
 75 Melissa A. Brown & Kenneth D. Crews, Art Image Copyright and Licensing: Terms 
and Conditions Governing Appearance & Composition of Images, at 15, 
http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/item/ac:128142 (includes summary of policy 
obtained from the Brooklyn Museum). 
 76 Application for Reproduction Rights and Request for Photographic Materials, THE 
JOHN & MABLE RINGLING MUSEUM OF ART, http://www.ringling.org/uploadedFiles/ 
Resources/Collections/Rights_Reproduction.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2012).  
 77 Application for Reproduction of Archival Materials for Publication, THE FRICK 
COLLECTION, http://www.frick.org/assets/PDFs/library/archives_pub_app _2004.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2012). 
 78 Copyright, PORTLAND ART MUSEUM, http://portlandartmuseum.org/about/copyright/ 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2012). 
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that many museums are looking for a specific set of standards that 
the law does not provide.  Hence the motivation to reach beyond 
the law and craft innovative rules of practice—but rules that in turn 
can hinder the use and enjoyment of art. 
4. Asserting Simulated Claims of Moral Rights 
Although the scope of moral rights in the U.S. is exceptionally 
narrow, it does apply to some works of visual art.
79
  Moral rights 
allow artists a legal right of paternity—the right to have the artist‘s 
name on the work.  Moral rights also give authors a right to 
prevent the intentional destruction or alteration of many works.  
These rights have given artists an occasional legal victory as they 
seek to protect the integrity of their works.
80
  Nevertheless, the 
American doctrine of moral rights applies narrowly to relatively 
few works and does not prevent many uses of art images that a 
rights holder might find objectionable.  As with so many aspects of 
copyright, if the law does not provide what you want, look instead 
to contractual obligations.  Hence, museum policies and practices 
often establish terms and conditions that are akin to moral rights. 
As with many terms, requirements in museum policies to credit 
the source are based on facially understandable desires.  Including 
the name of the artist in connection with the use of the image is 
consistent with well-established principles of moral rights.  By 
contrast, museums as the owner of the original work of art or the 
supplier of a photographic image generally do not have claims of 
moral rights in the United States or in other countries.  
Nevertheless, a policy request from a museum to include credit to 
the institution is not unusual and is often not unduly burdensome.  
 
 79 Some scholars have argued strongly for greater moral rights, applicable to a wider 
range of works. See generally, e.g., ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF 
CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES (Stanford Law 
Books 2010). 
 80 Prior to the passage of the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), various U.S. states 
provided for the protection of moral rights under ―theories of copyright, unfair 
competition, defamation, invasion of privacy, and breach of contract.‖  Waiver of Moral 
Rights in Visual Artworks, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright. 
gov/reports/exsum.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2012).  In Gilliam v. American Broadcasting 
Companies, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 23–24 (2d Cir. 1976), the court found that ABC‘s 
unauthorized edits of a Monty Python television program created an actionable mutilation 
of the work derived from the concept of droit moral and protected under the Lanham Act. 
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Indeed, generously citing sources is ordinarily welcomed as good 
practice in any scholarly study. 
Some museums go far beyond simple requests for credit and 
call for various statements of identity and control.  The Fine Arts 
Museum of San Francisco allows uses of images with this caveat: 
―Your product must be copyrighted and contain general notice of 
copyright which includes the following language . . . .‖81  First, this 
policy statement is a direct, yet odd, interference with the 
independent decision of the user to claim or not claim copyright 
protection for an article or other project that might include the art 
image.  The museum‘s policy seems to be directly undercutting 
any notion that the author of the study may have about either 
making the work available in the public domain or possibly even 
interfering with the selection of a Creative Commons license.
82
  
This claim of credit and assertion of downstream rights is brazen at 
best.
83
 
Moral rights can protect against destruction or alteration of 
artworks, and policy statements from museums often incorporate 
this concept in extraordinary detail.  Policies often prohibit the use 
of images to create derivative works.  Also barred under the 
standards of many museums is any alteration of the work or 
bleeding of the image off the printed page.  Policies sometimes 
prohibit cropping or masking of the image, or superimposition of 
any text on top of the image.  Perhaps most pernicious for 
scholarly study are policies which constrain the use of detailed 
excerpts from art images.
84
 
 
 81 Conditions for Print and Electronic Publication, FINE ARTS MUSEUMS OF SAN 
FRANCISCO, http://deyoung.famsf.org/conditions-print-and-electronic-publication (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2012). 
 82 CREATIVE COMMONS, supra note 59. 
 83 The same policy also requires that the use of the image be accompanied by the 
following language: ―Warning: All rights reserved.  Unauthorized public performance, 
broadcasting, transmission, or copying, mechanical or electronic, is a violation of 
applicable laws.  This product and individual images contained within are protected 
under the Laws of the U.S. and other countries.  Unauthorized duplication, distribution, 
transmission, or exhibition of the whole or of any part therein may result in civil liability 
and criminal prosecution.  The downloading of images is not permitted.‖ Conditions for 
Print and Electronic Publication, supra note 81. 
 84 Museums do not often outright bar the use of detail, but they do subject them to 
review and consent.  This statement is from the North Carolina Museum of Art: ―Each 
object must be reproduced in its entirety on all or part of a single page unless otherwise 
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Examples of confining and deleterious policy language are 
legion.  The Frick Collection policy stipulates: ―Permission to 
reproduce is granted so long as the image is reproduced in full.  
Requests to copy, bleed, tone, silhouette, superimpose type matter, 
or alter an image in any way must be included in the application 
with the exact layout of proposed alteration.‖85  Details are a 
mainstay of scholarly inquiry, and they allow experts to examine 
specific aspects of the artwork more closely in order to better 
understand the technique and the message of the painting. 
Similarly, the Detroit Institute of Arts makes this provision: 
―Any color manipulation, alteration, cropping or addition to the 
image is prohibited and will automatically render the license void.  
Overprinting of text on an image requires specific permission.‖86  
An artist may reasonably have concerns about any such uses of his 
or her creative work.  The dilemma in the context of museums, 
however, is that very often the artist is no longer alive to express 
concerns or assert any rights.  Under U.S. law, the right of the 
artist to assert any such moral rights is in most instances limited to 
the lifetime of the artist.
87
  The copyright may survive seventy 
years after the death of the artist, but the moral rights generally do 
not. 
Thus this assertion of quasi-moral rights runs counter to two 
general principles of concern to this study.  First, the policies are 
used to assert a roster of rights that exceed the equation of 
copyright law as developed by Congress.  Second, to the extent 
that the museum is asserting these rights with respect to works of 
deceased artists and works in the public domain that no longer 
have copyright protection, the museum policies are functioning as 
an extension of copyright-like claims far beyond the reach of 
 
approved by the Museum in advance.  An approved detail must be identified in the 
caption.‖ Melissa A. Brown, Art Image Copyright and Licensing: Terms and Conditions 
Governing Appearance & Composition of Images, at 10 (2010), http://academic 
commons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:128152 (includes summary of policy obtained from 
the North Carolina Museum of Art). 
 85 Id. at 33. 
 86 Id. at 25. 
 87 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(1) (2006).  In an odd variation on the 
rule, if the work of art is in existence at the time of passage of the act in 1990, but title to 
the physical work was as of that date still with the artist, then the moral rights last for the 
full term of copyright protection. See id. § 106A(d)(2). 
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protection that was carefully crafted in the shaping of actual 
copyright law.
88
 
CONCLUSION 
Copyright overreaching comes in many forms, and museum 
policies and licenses are but one version.  An examination of 
policies from U.S. museums suggests four varieties of copyright 
overreaching by museum standards: assertions of false copyrights; 
claims to copyrights not held by the museum; assertion of control 
beyond rights of copyright; and claims of quasi-moral rights.  
Isolating discrete forms of overreaching can help clarify the 
relationship between museum standards and the norms of 
copyright law.  Recognizing that nexus can help one understand 
how far some policies have moved from the principles of copyright 
law. 
Analysis of museum policies can also aid in a comparative 
understanding of terms and practices, opening exploration of 
alternative approaches for policymaking on similar issues.  While 
this article is critical of overreaching policies, the examination of 
museum practices also highlights proactive alternatives that some 
museums have employed to prevent or at least reduce risks of 
overreaching.  Consider this statement from the Guggenheim: 
In order to further support the work of teachers and 
educators, in accordance with our own charitable 
and educational mission, we therefore consent to the 
following additional uses of our Site: . . . 
reproduction, distribution, display, transmission, 
performance, and use of the Content . . . by 
individual teachers and other educators if done for 
the limited purpose of classroom or workshop 
instruction (including online instruction) in a 
 
 88 Leveraging legal rights to gain contractual obligations beyond the term of copyright 
protection has been grounds for claims of ―copyright misuse,‖ a doctrine that can result in 
a loss of the copyright. See, e.g., Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979 
(4th Cir. 1990). 
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school, museum, or other educational 
organization . . . .
89
 
The Guggenheim‘s policy statement is a proactive step to assure 
public rights of use and to facilitate beneficial activities whether or 
not they are established in copyright law.
90
 
Despite the availability of options, many museums continue to 
assert claims that do no comport with the law and that impose 
burdensome restrictions on users of art images.  This article 
identifies some of the root causes of these conventional practices.  
Some of the causes may be described as legal inertia.  For a 
museum to take a position that works are actually in the public 
domain or otherwise available for use is to take a public legal 
position, and with it go responsibilities for errors and 
misconstructions.  Museums are also themselves burdened by 
restrictions that they sometimes are obliged to pass along.  A 
collection may come to the institutions with conditions and limits 
imposed by the donor or artist.  If the museum accepts those terms, 
 
 89 Terms and Conditions of Use, SOLOMON R. GUGGENHEIM FOUND., 
http://www.guggenheim.org/terms-conditions/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).  Many 
education and research uses of images could be within fair use. See Phelan, supra note 3, 
at 197–202.  Fair use in American law is codified at Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 
107 (2006).  The question of whether particular uses are fair is outside the scope of this 
article.  The key point of this study is the extent to which museum practices support or 
hinder public uses of art images.  For an insightful and recent statement about fair use of 
art images, see VISUAL RESOURCES ASS‘N, STATEMENT ON THE FAIR USE OF IMAGES FOR 
TEACHING, RESEARCH, AND STUDY (2011), published at 27 VISUAL RESOURCES 286 
(2011). 
 90 Some other museums have similarly helpful language in their policies.  From the 
Milwaukee Art Museum: 
Fair use of copyrighted material includes the use of protected 
materials for noncommercial educational purposes, such as teaching, 
scholarship, research, criticism, commentary, and news reporting.  
Unless otherwise noted, users who wish to download or print text, 
audio, video, image and other files from the Milwaukee Art 
Museum‘s Web site for such uses are welcome to do so without the 
Milwaukee Art Museum‘s express permission.  Users must cite the 
author and source of this material as they would material from any 
printed work; the citation should include the [museum‘s] URL. . . . 
 Rights & Reproduction, MILWAUKEE ART MUSEUM, http://www.mam.org/ 
info/policies/rights-reproduction.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2012). 
2012] MUSEUM POLICIES AND ART IMAGES 833 
 
it may have no choice but to further impose them on subsequent 
users.
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More philosophically, many museums see themselves as 
responsible for the integrity and reputation of the art and the artist.  
That is an admirable vision, and it is consistent in some respects 
with the aims of moral rights.  However, museum policies often 
become a detailed litany of specific credit lines, permission 
requirements, and specifics about cropping, coloration, alterations, 
and even whether the image may run over the edge of printed 
pages in a book or other study.  Art is a noble venture, and 
museums are crucial for advancing the public‘s understanding and 
appreciation of it.  Yet sometimes creative exploration, 
comprehension, and advancement of art comes from alteration, 
manipulation, and mashup.  Museums that set limits on innovative 
pursuits risk setting limits on experimentation and promotion of art 
itself. 
This article offers a new analytical means for better 
understanding how museums overreach their copyrights.  One 
practical outcome of such an examination of museum policies 
could be to encourage museum officials and others to focus more 
clearly on individual policy terms, their consequences, and the 
possible alternative standards.  The most important practical 
objective, however, would be to encourage a reconsideration of 
policy terms at individual museums.  Much of this article is shaped 
by a copyright perspective; the more important perspective is the 
encouragement of public knowledge and appreciation of art.  To 
that end, the time has come for a rethinking of museum policies.
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 91 These pressures and others are part of the fundamental transformation that museums 
are experiencing. See Carpenter, supra note 21, at 466–67 (―The very identity of the 
museum has come into question over the last couple of decades.  Not only have museum 
professionals increasingly questioned the function and purpose of museums, but donors, 
artists, politicians, businesspeople, and the public have done so, as they are asked with 
greater frequency to support museums through donations, financial sponsorships, 
legislation, policy decisions, and attendance.‖). 
 92 Some backlash has begun.  A statement from the Max Planck Institute challenges 
the constraints and claims from museums and urges, ―[r]epositories should define access 
to cultural heritage objects solely as owners, not as copyright holders.‖ See Best Practices 
for Access to Images: Recommendations for Scholarly Use and Publishing, MAX PLANCK 
INST. FOR THE HISTORY OF SCI. (Jan. 5, 2009), http://www.mpiwgberlin.mpg. 
de/PDF/MPIWGBestPracticesRecommendations.pdf. 
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At a time when visual images are becoming a more important 
means of communication, and museums are making vast and 
diverse collections available online for access worldwide, the need 
for reevaluation is imperative.
93
  The opportunity for improved 
policymaking never has been as possible or as important. 
 
 
 93 See Ortega, supra note 45, at 582–84. 
